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"THE VERY DOGS LICKED
THE SORES OF LAZARUS"
Hobbes and Bramhall's
Debate on Free Will
David Mazella'
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n 1645 Thomas Hobbes and John Bramhall, Bishop of
Derry, were both refugees in Paris from the troubles at
home.^ Like the members of another defeated force, the
two entertained the irksome hours by reasoning high of "providence,
foreknowledge, will, and fate,/Fixed fate, free will, foreknowledge
absolute." In their discussions, Hobbes and Bramhall soon learned the
depth of their disagreement: Bramhall was a determined Arminian, and
Hobbes in his own peculiar way a predestinarian Calvinist.^ Nonethe-

^ I wouldlike to thank Michael Seideland Vicky Silver for their considerable help on the initial
version of this material. Since my arrival at the University of Houston, Jay Kastely has been an
in'N^uable reader and general source of encouragement throughout the process of revision. I
would sdso like to acknowledge the vital support provided by a Universi^ of Houston RIG
grant during the writing and research of this artide.
^ See Mintz*s historical backgrotmd to the debate,n. 4 below, aswell as Johann P.Sommerville,
Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas inHistorical Context (NewYork: St. Martin's, 1992), 21-22,136,
137, 148; John Bowie, "Bishop John Bramhall's ^Catching of the Leviathan"* in Hobbesand his
Critics: A Study inSeventeenth Century Constitutionalism (New York: Oxford University Press,
1952), 114-33; Geoi^e Croom Robertson, Hobbes (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1910), 163-67.
^ For theclassic discussion of the rel^ious dimension of Hobbes's thought, see J. G. A. Pocock,
"Time, History, and Eschatology in the Thought of Thomas Hohhed* mPolitics,Language,and
Time: Essays on Political Thought and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989),
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less, they conducted their debate civilly enough, then wrote up further
written replies, which were also exchanged/ And there, both men
believed, the matter rested, with no change in position registered on
either side.
In 1654, however, a third party obtained a copy of Hobbes's
version of the text and published it without Hobbes's knowledge, while
adding his own anti-clerical preface. The bishop, who held Hobbes
responsible for both the sneering preface and the omission of his
replies, republished his old responses, adding for good measure a new
appendix attacking the Leviathan, which had appeared three years
earlier. Hence, Of Liberty and Necessity and the Questions concerning
Liberty, Necessity and Chance have always traveled in the polemical orbit
of the Leviathan, inciting the clergy and universities against their
author, and consolidating his popular reputation for irreligion. It can
be fairly said that the involuntary publication of Liberty and Necessity
and the Questions helped, along with the notoriety of Leviathan, to

148-201. See also Herbert W. Sdmeider, "TbePieiy of Hobbes"andPaulJ.Jolmsoii, "Hobbes's
Anglican Doctriiie of Salvation" in Thomas Hohhes in his Time^ ed. Ralpb Ross, Herbert W.
Sdmeider, andTbeodore Waldman ^Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press,1974), 84-101
and 102-28, respectively; Willis B. Glover, "God and Tbomas Hobbes," in Hohhes Studies,ed.
K.C. Brown (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 141-68; Alan Ryan, "Hobbes and
Individualism" and Arr^o Paccbi, "Hobbes and the Problem of God"in Perspectives on Thomas
Hohhes, ed. GA.J. Rogers and Alan Ryan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 81-105; 171-87.
Tbougb tbe question of tbe "atbeism" of Hobbes bas become less a matter of debate in tbe
scbolarsbip, not many pbilosopbical commentators bave attempted to work out precisely bow
Hobbes's writings on religion (as in tbe two treatises discussed in tbis essay) migbt affect tbe
mteipretationoftbemajorworksinbispbilosopbicalcotpus. Tbedassicpbilosopbictreatment
of Hobbes's tbeism can be found in A.E.Taylor, "Tbe Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes" in Hohhes
Studies, 35-55; and Howard Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hohhes: His Theory of
Obligation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957). Tt^etber, these works bave become
known as tbe "Taylor-Warrender thesis" that bas stirred much debate in tbe ffeld, without
winning many converts. A.P. Martinicb's reading of Leviathan is one of tbe most recent and
thoroughgoing attempts to read Hobbes in tbe l^bt of texts such as tbe Questions. See A J*.
Martinicb, The Tuvo Gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hohhes on Religion and Politics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992); for anotherapproach to tbe problem, see P.O. Hood, The
Divine Politics of Thomas Hohhes: An Interpretation of Leviathan (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1964).
* One of tbe best recent discussions centered upontbe Questionsis Mark Goldie, "Tbe Reception
of Hobbes" in The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1410-1700, ed. Jdf. Bums and Mark
Goldie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 589-615. Other important discussions
include Samuel Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1962), 11-12,110-33;LeopoldDamroscb,Jr., "Hobbes as Reformation Theologian: Implications
of tbe Free WiU Controversy."Journal of the History of Ideas 40, no. 3 (1979): 339-52; LesKe
Stephen, Hohhes (London: Macmillau, 1904).
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create the notion of "Hobbism" that shadows Hobbes studies to this
day.® Yet "Hobbism" is not merely the name for a willful misreading
of Hobbes, but an important sign of the public nature of bis philosoph
ical career, and the degree to which it lies outside the actions and
intentions of the historical agents who participated in it, even as his
opponents. Just as "Hobbism" quickly detached itself from the
historical Thomas Hobbes, becoming a kind of bogeyman haunting
him throughout his life, the unexpectedly autonomous and self-sustain
ing quality of Hobbes and Bramhall's exchange, once it entered the
public realm of political discussion, offers a significant pattern for
understanding the debate in intellectual history. Though both men felt
they had conclusively stated their own views, the final result was in fact
far more ambiguous and inconclusive than either of them could
acknowledge. In an interesting way, the importance of the debate lies
in the fact that it cannot be reduced to the determinate meanings
offered by the two participants in the struggle: the contested terms (free
will, Arminianism, Calvinism) remained far too significant to too many
different people for their meanings to be restricted to the participants'
own definitions.
The ironies surrounding this discussion, however, deserve further
comment, and are in large part caused by the large-scale historical
events that overtook both men during the long course of the debate.
In effect, Hobbes and Bramhall were reenacting in 1645 the arguments
that lay near the origins of the civil war, retracing the steps toward the
traumatic event that had subsequently driven them both into exile.
The real energy of the exchange, however, comes not from their
obvious differences in doctrine, but their anger at finding themselves
together on the same defeated side. To each man, his opponent
symbolized all the wrong turns taken by the royalists over the years.
From Hobbes's anti-clerical point of view, the choice of Bramhall to
represent Arminianism was well-nigh providential. Bramhall was the
so-called "Bishop Bramble," an ambitious, politically active bishop who
had once vigorously instituted Laudian doctrine in the Church of
Ireland, and who still endorsed, even in exile. Laud's vision of a happy
partnership of church and king.® From Bramhall's perspective in 1654,
* This is essentully the entire subject of Mintz's study. See also Goldie, "Reception," 607-08.
'ForBraniha]l's"nioderateRoyaIism,"seeJohnSandeison, "Seipent-Salve, 164J:theRoyalism
of John Bramhall."/owrwa/ ofEccUsiastical History 25, no. 1 (1974): 1-14.
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the rather unappealing political theories of Leviathan, as well as
Hobbes's recent compromises with the Commonwealth government,
made Hobbes a perfect representative of all the tendencies of the age
towards atheism, materialism, and political innovation. Each man
relished the work of demolishing his opponent's arguments, hoping to
win back on this occasion what had once been lost by others' folly
during the war.
Yet long before their stand-off in Paris, Hobbes and Bramhall's
respective theological positions had been saturated with specific
political meanings for over a century. Calvinism could always be
turned to outright anti-clericalism by a Protestant laity, while the
Arminian clergy who opposed Calvinism often did so in the name of
national and religious unity. Predestinarian Calvinism, which denied
free will, had from the Reformation onwards always created significant
difficulties of church government for those interested, as the English
Arminians generally were, in maintaining a comprehensive national
church.^
Complicating this longstanding problem in English
Protestantism was the fact that the most recent English Arminians such
as Laud and his follower Bramhall obviously endorsed the indetermi
nacy of free will not for the sake of believers' freedom, but to leave
room for the operations of priestly mediators upon their flocks.'
Hence, Laud's highly politicized Arminianism was always vulnerable
to attack as a crypto-papist retreat from the English Protestant
tradition.'
Yet the civil war had irreversibly altered the ground upon which
Calvinists and Arminians fought over free will. The unintended effea
of Laud's policies was to set into motion ruinous political forces far
beyond the control of either church or king, a lesson which Hobbes
never forgot, and which he ceaselessly repeated to Bramhall. For
Hobbes, because the civil war had been partly caused by the ambitions
' Tke dassic discussion is that of Emst Troeltsch, The Social Teaching of the Christian ChurcheSy
tr. Olive Wyon, 2 vols. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1931). See also Christopher Hill, 'The
Protestant Nation" in The Collected Essays of Christopher Hilly Vol. II (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1986), 21-36.
' See, for example, Hugh Trevor-Roper, "Laudianism and Political Power" in Catholics,
Anglicans andPuritans: Seventeenth Century Essays(Chic^o: University of Chicago Press, 1988),
40-119.
'SeeJohn Selden*s remarkable admission: **We charge the Prelatical Cleigy with Popery to make
them odious, though we know they are guilty of no such thing." From TaUe-Talky ed. Edward
Arber (London: Murray & Son, 1868), 89. Qtd. in Trevor-Roper, **Laudianism," 103.
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of the Laudian clergy, who had foolishly pursued a theological dispute
they could neither contain nor conclude, any potential sovereign who
wished to survive would have to subordinate the clergy to his own
political purposes. Hence, Bramhall's defense of free will is for Hobbes
not merely a foolish relic of an antiquated philosophic vocabulary, not
merely a backing away from the correct reformed tradition of
theology, but ultimately a stalking-horse for priestly control of English
society.
Before moving into the precise dynamics of the Hobbes-Bramhall
exchange, however, the history of the Calvinist/Arminian distinction
offers some insight into the ways in which the two men took up a
venerable set of theological differences to formulate their own current
political disagreements. According to Article XVII of the Thirty-Nine
Articles of the Church of England (as set in 1571, and as it remained
through the time of this dispute into the nineteenth century), the
official, undeniably Calvinist doctrine of the English church holds that
Predestination
is the euerlastyng purpose of God, whereby (before the
foundations of the world were layd) he hath constantly
decreed by his councell secrete to vs, to deliuer from curse
and damnation, those whom he hath chosen in Christe out
of mankynde, and to bryng them by Christe to euerlastyng
saluation, as vessels made to honour. Wherefore they which
be indued with so excellent a benefite of God, be called
accordyng to Gods purpose by his spirite workyng in due
season: they through grace obey the callyng: they be iustified
freely: they be made sonnes of God by adoption.^®
In other words, God, before the beginning of time, predestined all
human beings to salvation or damnation, regardless of their own will
in the matter. Although this doctrine offers a potentially frightening
prospect to the majority of Christians who might find themselves
permanently and irrevocably outside the "purpose of God," it does
possess a certain logical consistency (salvation comes only from God,
For my text of Article XVII, I tave med tke text reprinted in Appendix I of Oliver
0*Donovan, On the Thirty Nine Articles: A Conversation with Tudor Christianity (Greenwood,
S.C.: Attic Press, 1986), 142-43, wliidi follows tte 1571 orthograpliy.
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and only when He intends it) and comparatively consoling certainty (if
God willed it, then salvation definitely occurs). Despite these consola
tions, however, many remained queasy about the doctrine, especially
for its ethical consequences: for those uncomfortable with its harshness
and indifference to human feeling or conduct, predestination implied
that humans could not influence their own eternal fate; at the same
time, it honored a God who seemed not merely omnipotent but
positively monstrous, an inhuman, unceasing source of sin and
punishment for the humanity he created. Those who became known
as Arminians consolidated these criticisms of Calvinism into a new
doctrine, which preached that predestination destroyed freedom of the
will, inasmuch as it emptied every subjeaive effort to worship God
into insignificance.
In conceiving of the full signifiance of the theological distinction
between Calvinism and Arminianism, it might help to regard their
respective definitions as crucially relational, more dependent upon a
logic of opposition than any intrinsic qualities on either side. John
Tulloch, for example, has formulated the distinaion in the following
way: the distinctive principles of Arminianism all take their start from
the fundamental modification of the cardinal doctrine of predestination
initiated by Arminius, and in conneaion with which the whole
movement arose. The divine decree to which human salvation is to be
attributed was, according to Calvin's conception, absolute and
irresistible. It implied a divine panition of the human race into saved
and not saved, originating in the pure will and determination of God.
The whole drama of the moral world, in short, in its antagonism of
good and evil, hung upon the absolute fiat of an Almighty Will.
Arminius passed out of the pure sphere of the divine to which Calvin
and his followers tended to confine their view, and brought promi
nently forward the free aaivity of the human will, as a co-determinant
in the work of salvation." Hence, the voluntarism of Calvin and his
most uncompromising followers, who did not hesitate to treat human
beings merely as objects of the divine will, could scarcely comprehend
those who regarded humanity as capable of willing itself into a state of
salvation. For each side, even admitting the premises of their oppo
nent's views was a morally unacceptable surrender of what they felt
" Join Tonncii. lUliansI TtmJtfry mJ Chnttun Fhiantfirf in {jtfjind in it* SfVmltmti
CrMary.a TrJt. (ttiUnlwim:
Oln» Vr»tj)[A«l>k«»Jlung. |%*), I;lfr.l7.
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was the central and defining attribute of the Divinity; for Calvinists,
the omnipotence of God; for Arminians, His mercy towards a
redeemable humanity.
Because the distinction between Calvinism and Arminianism was
so fruitful for controversy, generating a series of violent and polarized
discussions between Protestants of all kinds, it became an important
marker of political divisions as well, since it helped to organize,
channel, and institutionalize conflicts within the Church of England
from the Reformation through the civil war. For this reason, the rise
of Arminianism has always been accounted one of the causes for the
English Revolution. This historical linkage, in fact, is seen as early as
Hobbes's own arguments against Bramhall, since Hobbes straightfor
wardly blamed the Arminians for provoking the civil war with their
political machinations. Similarly, Nicholas Tyacke, one of the latest
historians of anti-Calvinism, holds that Arminianism, though initially
a purely theological term describing the doctrine of Jacob Arminius in
Holland, soon grew into "a coherent body of anti-Calvinist religious
thought," which eventually became associated with Laud's unpopular
policies of persecuting the Calvinist seas and using state power to
promote the church's own interests." This interpretation ,of the
specifically anti-Calvinist politics of the movement is supported by the
fact that, even after Laud's execution, Arminianism never lost its
association with politically aaive churchmanship and overweening
clerical ambition. As the old story goes: "What do the Arminians
hold?" someone asked the Bishop of Winchester. "All the best
bishoprics and deaneries in England," he replied."
Curiously, the scholarly furor over Tyacke's interpretation, which
has not gone forward unopposed, resembles the polemical history it

Nicholas Tyacke, Anti-Calvinists The Rise of En^ish Arminianism c. 1S90-1640 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1987), 245-6; see also Mintz, Hunting, 116-7. A critique of Tyacke can be
found in Peter White, Predestination, Policy and Polemic (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992). Yet another reading of the problem of theological consensus and conflict in the
16th-centuty church can be fotmd in Peter Lake, Moderate Puritans and the Elizahethan Church
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Essays by Tyacke, White, and Lake can be
found in the convenient collection edited by Margo Todd entitled Reformation to Revolution:
Politics and Religion in Early Modem England (New York: Roudedge, 1995). For an acute
treatment ofthehistoriographicalproblem,see William Lamont, "Arminianism: thecontroversy
that never was" in Political Discourse in Early Modem Britain, ed. Nicholas Phillipson and
Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 45-66.
" Mintz, Hunting, 117.

352

1650-1850

narrates in one important respect: the problem of definition, or, more
precisely, the choice of perspective from which to define such a
contested concept. Given the polemical environment in which these
theological arguments took place, the problem of defining a contested
concept like Arminianism seems insoluble, although a clear definition
remains a precondition for solving other historical problems. As J. G.
A. Pocock remarked recently in a review-essay:
It is notoriously difficult to distinguish between those who
were perceived as "Arminians," those who perceived them
selves as "Arminians," and those who perceived themselves as
something else and were or were not in sympathy with what
they perceived "Arminianism" to be; and...Lamont [author
of a recent survey of the question, nl2 above] does not take
us too deep into the wood where Tyacke, Lake and White
debate how far there was a quasi-Galvinist consensus in the
Church of England before Laud's advent and how far an
"Arminian" or some other assault upon it afterwards. Yet
the problem is crucial in the history of English political
theology and in Anglo-British-European historiography."
Pocock articulates a crucial historiographical problem: the understand
ing of Arminianism holds the key for analyzing the breadth and depth
of Calvinism as a disturbance in English history, and for locating the
English religious and political experience of the Reformation within the
broader context of European history. Yet the definition itself has
seemed unattainable, precisely because of the conflicts surrounding it
throughout its history of usage. Any historical explanation of the term
must somehow take into account the conflicts it provoked, without
resolving them in a false or anachronistic manner.
We can see in Tulloch's description quoted above the tension
between the historical conflict and his own desire to resolve them into
a framework capable of holding them both simultaneously, making
some kind of comparison, perhaps even evaluation, possible of the two
views. Yet his anachronistic term for the Arminians—the "'Rational'
element"—clearly indicates his own moral preference, securely locating
" Pocock, discussing Lamout's "Arminianism" (see 12n) in "A discourse of sovereignty:
observations of the work in progress," in Po/itiW Discowrse, 391.
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them in an optimistic, teleological narrative of an ever-more rational
and liberal religion developing in England from the seventeenth
century into his own time. I point this out not to denigrate Tulloch's
passion for the "'rational' theologians," nor to question his scholarly
achievement, but simply to indicate how differently the stakes of such
a debate appear when the combatants represent laity and clergy, as in
the case of Hobbes and Bramhall, and not different representatives of
the clergy, as in, say, the letters of Whichcote and Tuckney.
So how might we avoid this particular kind of anachronism, and
see the debate not only as a dialogue between individuals and their
worldviews but also as representatives of particular institutions and
their interests? First of all, we should note that both sides in this free
will dispute operate with notions of reason, freedom, and constraint
very different from our own. Second, neither of the disputants is
particularly interested in pursuing what might seem to American
readers to be the entire point of the debate, the freedom of individuals.
The lawyer-scholar John Selden (a friend of Hobbes, and one whose
anti-clerical History of Tythes enraged Laud) once described the
Calvinist-Arminian conflict in the following blunt fashion:
The Puritans who will allow no free will at all, but God does
all, yet will allow the Subject his Liberty to do or not to do,
nothwithstanding the King, the God upon earth. The
Arminians, who hold we have free will, yet say, when we
come to the King there must be all Obedience, and no
Liberty must be stood for.*'
In other words, from Selden's skeptical point of view, neither
Puritans nor Arminians are interested in granting additional freedom
to their followers, or in pursuing the dangerous analogy between
" JoJm Selden, "Free wiU" in TaUe-Talk, ed. Edward Arber (London: Murray & Son, 1868),
50-51. Also relevant are some of liis remarks on predestination: "3. Predestination is a point
inaccessible, out of our reach; we can make no notion of it, *tis so full of intricacy, so fuH of
contradiction: *tisin good earnest, aswe state it, half adozen Bullsone uponanother. 4. Doctor
Prideaux in his Lectures, several days us*d Aiguments to prove Predestination; at last tells his
Auditory they are damn*d that donot believe it; doing herein just like School-boys, when one
of themhas got an Apple, or something the resthave a mindto, they use aQ the Aiguments they
can to get some it from them: I gave you some Pother day: You dtall have some with me another
time, when they cannot prevail, they tell him he's a Jackanapes, a Rogue and a Rascal," from
"Predestuiation," 95-6.
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religious and political freedoms: Puritans grant political liberty to the
individual while denying him any freedom in his relations with God,
while Arminians uphold free will in religious matters while denying it
in matters of state. If correct, Selden's diagnosis of the free will dispute
would suggest that the argument between Hobbes and Bramhall was
less a struggle between the forces of freedom and unfreedom over the
abstract principle of liberty, than a fierce contest between two elites,'
clerical and political, for the use of a vocabulary of moral evaluation.
As we shall see, the power to evaluate others morally, directing blame
towards specific social targets, was an important prerogative of the
priestly class, and one which justified their privileges in a hierarchical
society. What Hobbes notices is that the normative chaos of the
interregnum has effectively wrested control of blame, and therefore of
religious, social, and political norms, from the clerical class. The
situation which permitted the debate even to enter the public sphere of
polemical discussion—a political struggle over contested normative
terms, a lack of consensus over the terms of moral evaluation, a failure
of the legitimating and political structures of society to work together
in an effective manner—are not, as Bramhall believed, regrettable lapses
in English religion and politics to be reversed with the return of royal
authority, but are in fact the defining characteristics of morality as it
must be practiced in modernity.

* The Debate *
Throughout his contentions with Bramhall, Hobbes focuses on the
question of the will and its supposed freedom from causation. In this
problem Hobbes finds very serious implications for religious conduct
(not belief) that Bramhall refuses to acknowledge. Hobbes argues
against the Bishop's notion that "not only man, but also his will is free,
and determined to this or that action, not by the will of God, nor
necessary causes, but by the power of the will itself (LNC 1)." Both

" The Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance, Clearly Stated and Debated hetvxen DfBramhall, Bishop ofDerry,and Thomas Hobbes ofMalmesbury, from TheEnglish Works of Thomas
Hobbes ofMalmesbury,ed.Siryffi5\bimMeAeswonk.'Vo\.'V (London: Bolm, 1841). 2ndRepiW^
Scientia Vedag, Allen, Germany, 1962. Subsequent references to this edition will be dted
parenthetically within the text by LNC followed by page number.
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men buttress their respective philosophical positions with theological
support, Hobbes from the Reformation tradition, Bramhall from the
Scholastic language of the schools. Hobbes, however, instantly
recognizes Bramhall's numerous debts to Catholic, neo-Aristotelian
thought, and tries to embarass the Bishop with the rather un-Protestant
provenance of his ideas.
At the very beginning of the debate, Hobbes notes how Calvinist
theology arose specifically to combat Catholic semipelagianism, which
Arminians like Bramhall would like to restore. Hobbes announces that
in this discussion it is he who carries the authority of the reformed
theologians over and against the Bishop:
And though by the reformed Churches instructed by Luther,
Calvin, and others, this opinion [that "not only man, but also
his will was free"] was cast out, yet not many years since it
began again to be reduced by Arminius and his followers, and
became the readiest way to ecclesiastical promotion; and by
discontenting those that held the contrary, was in some part
the cause of the following troubles; which troubles were the
occasion of my meeting with the Bishop of Derry at Paris
(LNC 1-2).
The ambiguity—or potential irony—of Hobbes's whimsical assumption
of theological authority in this passage, like the famous ambiguity of his
"Fiat, or the Let us make man," in the Introduction to Leviathan, raises
the larger question of secularization throughout these debates.'^
Hobbes consistently practices a critical "de-sacralization" of the clergy,
church, and universities that reveals their hidden, temporal motivations
in the history he is retelling. Hobbes's de-sacralization of religious
institutions not only allows him to unmask his clerical opponents in
debate, by reveding their self-interested behavior in the past, but also
instructs them in their true social function, as members of institutions
located securely within (not outside or above) temporal society.
My use of the term "de-sacralization," taken from C. J. Sommerville's study of secularization in early modern England, allows us to
read Hobbes's anti-clericalism as part of an historical process of

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ed. C.B. Macpherson (New York: Penguin, 1968), 81-82.
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secularization rather than some version of atheism or irreligion, as the
"anti-Hobbists" assumed. This kind of distinction reaches towards the
massive historical importance of Hobbes, whose religious views, no
matter how idiosyncratic, are in fact influential precisely because they
are not isolated from the rest of his society. Hobbes, like Machiavelli,
provokes the amount of comment he does by acknowledging the extent
to which the existing structures of society have moved past their stated
theistic norms and values. Hobbes reveals the process by which norms
of every kind, even religious norms, are reshaped by the contingent,
historical facts of social or political organization.''
Hobbes's polemical technique of secularizing and demystifying the
immediate past allows him to point out the Bishop's distance from the
reformed tradition of theology, a distance which ought to reduce his
authority considerably in this discussion. Hobbes also undermines the
religious authority of ecclesiastics generally by reminding them of their
current political powerlessness, noting how their former political
ambitions had thoroughly destroyed both church and state in England,
leaving the two debaters stranded in Paris." According to Hobbes,
My discussion of secularization is indebted to C. J. Sommerville*s most recent study, The
Secularization of Early Modem England, as well as the treatments of the subject by Michael
McKeonandtheGermansociol<^istNikIasLuhmann. Sommervillehas revised Weber^sfamous
secularization thesis, so that Protestantism in general, not just the Calvinist sects that Weber
f ocused on, produces the religious imptdses that result in the unintentional ^^disenchantment of
the world.** Sommerville has also moved die b^innii^s of secularization back from the
industrialization and skeptic^m of thee^hteenth century to much earlierreligious and political
events in the sixteenth: in Sommervifle*s view, Henry VIIPsseizure of monastery lands was the
decisive startmg'point. Henty*spersonalschismwith papalauthoritypermanentlysubordinated
the English church establishment to its temporal government (18-32). See The Secularization of
Early ModemEngland: From ReligiousCulture to Religious Faith (New York: Oxford UP, 1992).
See also Michael McKeon, "Politics of Discourses and the Rise of the Aesthetic in Seven
teenth-Century England** in Politics of Discourse: The Literature and History of Seven'
teenth-Century England, ed. Kevin Sharpe and Steven N. Zwicker (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 198^, 35-51 as well as "Protestantsand Capitalists** in The Origins of theEnglish
Baltimore: JohnsHopkins University Press, 1987), 189-200. ForLuhmatm,
see Essays on SdfR^erence (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).
As Hobbes once put it: "Whatsoever Power Ecdesiasticks take uponthemselves (inany place
where they are subject to the State) intheir own right, although they call it Gods right, it is but
usurpation** ^^e Last Sayings,or DyingLegacy of Mr. ThomasHohhs ofMalmeshury, Who departed
this Life on Thursday, Decemh. 4. 1679 (London: Printed for the author*s executors, 1680),
^broadside). Such anti-clerical sentiments, of course, are inteD^ble both as thorot^hly
conventional eiqjressions of Protestant hostility to priestcraft, as well as a blueprint for a
secularizing, rationalizing political statecraft. As Pocock has pointed out in other essays,
Hobbes*s dialectical move against the clergy helps provoke in its turn a massive institutional
self-defense now known as Latitudinarian theology, which in many respects can be considered
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when the Laudians disregarded the wisdom of Luther and Calvin to run
after promotion, their efforts brought nothing but their own downfall
in the Civil War, "the occasion of my meeting with the Bishop of
Derry at Paris."^® Hobbes has the bishop to thank for this occasion of
merely intellectual debate.
As Hobbes admits at the outset, both men agree "that men are free
to do as they will and to forbear as they will"; that is, men are not
automata, and have enough freedom to act or not on the basis of their
own will (see "To the Reader"). Hobbes and Bramhall, however, differ
on three crucial points: what is the nature of the will; whether events
follow necessity or chance; and whether God's foreknowledge permits

a symptom of tke very secularization it attempts to oppose; see J. G. A. Pocock, "Clei^ and
Commerce: The Conservative Enlightenment in England" in VEta dei Lumiy ed. R. Ajello
(Naples: Jovene, 1985), 525-62, and "Post-Puritan England and the Problem of Enhghtenmeni^
in Culture and Politics from Puritanism to the Enlightenment^ ed. Perez Zagorin (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1980), 91-111, esp. 101. Hobbes's deliberately reductive
treatment of the deigy and its politico-theological interests here also accords with the
explanations offered in his account of the causes of the civil war, see Behemoth, or The Long
Parliament, ed. Ferdinand Tonnies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). Crucialfor
this strategyis his critique of thenotion of "conscience," which can be used equally well against
both clerical and enthusiastic daims to political authority. For Hobbes's relativization of the
claims of conscience, see Reinhart Koselleck, Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the
Pathogenesis of Modem Society (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), esp. chapter 2, "Hobbesian
Rationality and the Origins of Enlightenment."
Hobbes is even blunterin his dialogue about the Civil Waj^s causesin Behemoth'. "To give the
Parliament another colourfor their accusation on foot, of the King as to introducing of Popery,
there was a great controversy between the Episcopal and Presbyterian cleigy about free
wiIl...[T]he question was left imdecided[at Dort], and became a subject to be disputed of inthe
universities here. All the Presbyterians were of the same mind with Gomar but a very great
many others not; and those were called here Arminians, who, because the doctrine of free will
had been exploded as a Papistical doctrine, and because the Presbyterians were far the greater
number, andalready infavour with the people, were generally hated. It was easy, therefore,for
the Parliament to make that calumny pass currently with the people, when the Archbishop of
Canterbury, Dr. Laud, was for Armin ins, and had a litde before, by his power ecdesiastical,
forbidden all ministers to preach to the people of predestination; and when all ministers that
were gracious with him, and hoped forany Church preferment, fell to preaching and writing
for free will, tothe uttermost of theirpower, asa proof of their ability andmerit. Besides, they
gave out, some of them, that the Archbishop was in heart a Papist; and in case he could effect
a toleration here of the Roman religion, was to have a cardinal's hat: which was not only false,
but also without any groimd at all for a suspicion." The only response by B., the other
participant in the dialogue, is this exclamation:"It is a strange thing, that scholars, obscure men,
and such as could receive no clarity but from the flame of the state, should be suffered to bring
their unnecessary disputes,and togetherwith them their quarrels, outof the universities into the
commonwealth; and more strange, that the state should engage in their parties, and not lather
put them both to silence," from Behemoth, Dialogue 2, 61-2.
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us to treat events as determined or free.^' Hobbes denies that the will
is free to will itself into different states, argues for necessity to uphold
causation against chance, and ultimately identifies God with necessity.^
Bramhall provides his own definition of the will, one steeped in
the neo-Aristotelian language of the universities, and denying Hobbes's
distinction between the will and the will to will. For Bramhall,
freedom and free will are identical: "If his will do not come upon him
according to his will, then he is not a free, nor yet so much as a
voluntary agent, which is T.H.'s liberty. Certainly all the freedom of
the agent is from the freedom of the will. If the will have no power
over itself, the agent is no more free than a staff in a man's hand" (LNC
43).^' He also complains that Hobbes's determinism
contradias the sense of all the world, that the will of man is
determined without his will, or without any thing in his
power. Why do we ask men whether they will do such a
thing or not? Why do we represent reasons to them? Why
do we pray them? Why do we entreat them? Why do we
blame them, if their will come not upon them according to
their will? (LNC 43)
Bramhall's own language and concepts have become so transparent to
him that he can criticize Hobbes for his violations of commonsense one

See Hobbes's summaiy of their respective positions in *To the Reader." See also Mintz,
Huntin%y 111-14.
^See "Tothe Reader'':he argues"that it isnot ina man's power now to dioose the willhe shall
have anon; that chanceproduceth nothiag; that all events and actions have theirnecessary causes;
that the will of God makes the necessity of all things."
Hobbes spends much of Behemoth showing how the "Universities have been to this nation, as
the woodenhorse was tothe Trojans," (40) and abusing them as nurseries of the clergy and the
last refuge of the false learning propounded by Aristotle and his medievalfollowers. Certainly
Bramhall embodiedmany of the thingsthat Hobbesdespised most-scholasticneo-Aiistotelianism, aswell as clericalambition and pride. For the link between Aristotle, free will, and clerical
ambition, see this exchange from Behemoth: "A....--[Aristoile] holdeth farther, that there be
many things that come to pass in this world from no necessity of causes, but mere contingencyj
causality yZnAfortune. B. Methinks, in this they make God standidle, andto bea merespectator
of the games of Fortune. For what God is the cause of, must needs come to pass, and (m.my
opinion) nothii^ else. But, because there must be some ground for the justice of the eternal
torment ofdie damned; perhaps itis this, thatmen's wills and propensionsare not (theythinly
in the hands of God, but of themselves; and in this abo I see somewhat conducing to the
authority of the Church," 42.
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moment and launch into a full scholastic set of distinctions the next.
Bramhall proceeds:
This is the belief of all mankind, which we have not learned
from our tutors, but is imprinted in our hearts by nature; we
need not turn over any obscure books to find out this truth.
The poets chaunt it in the theatres, the shepherds in the
mountains, the pastors teach it in their churches, the doctors
in the universities, the common people in the markets, and
all mankind in the world do assent unto it, except an handful
of men who have poisoned their intellectuals with paradoxi
cal principles. (LNC 44)
Hobbes ridicules Bramhall's "piece of eloquence," identifies its
source in Cicero, and agrees with him that "very few have learned from
tutors, that a man is not free to will; nor do they find it much in
books" (LNC 53-54). As for Bramhall's witnesses the unspoiled poets,
shepherds, doctors, and so on, Hobbes admits that he and they assent
to the same thing, "that a man hath freedom to do if he will; but
whether he hath freedom to will, is a question which it seems neither
the Bishop nor they ever thought on" (LNC 54). Bramhall's argumen
tative flight first to his authorities, then back to some common
experience of all men fails to answer the truly difficult point of
Hobbes's attack, which is that an individual's own experience of free
will cannot be considered the ultimate test of its validity; it is perfectly
consistent with Hobbes's determinism for everyone to be unaware of
its existence at least part of the time.
Admittedly, one difficulty in reading this exchange is the jarring
effect of incommensurable epistemes crashing against each other, so
that the scholastic vocabulary of the bishop repeatedly collides with the
steely, plain prose style of Hobbes. Both writers refuse to acknowledge
the validity of the other's vocabulary, and enjoy ridiculing their
opponent's language and terms. The bishop treats Hobbes's refusal to
engage with his neo-Aristotelian distinctions as a symptom of his vanity
and false intellectual confidence, complaining at one point:
I cannot but observe there is not one word of art in this
whole treatise which he useth in the right sense; I hope it
doth not proceed out
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of a contempt of former writers, nor out of a desire to take in
sunder the whole frame of learning and new mould it after
his own mind. It were to be wished that at least he would
give us a new dictionary, that we might understand his sense.
(LNC 75)

The frustration voiced in this passage indicates the normative
status that Bramhall has already accorded his own terms and distinc
tions, and his outrage at hearing Hobbes reject them as so many empty,
insubstantial words. Bramhall cannot acknowledge the existence of a
"frame of learning" different from his own, and so imputes Hobbes's
entire stance to intellectual hubris and false confidence. In fact, the
frequent accusations of nonsense traded by both men in the course of
the debate demonstrate the incommensurability of their views and
vocabularies, the radically different paradigms they inhabit; these could
be described not just as Calvinist vs. Arminian, but also as modern vs.
medieval, with Hobbes's old-fashioned Calvinism oddly aligned with
his modernity and intellectual innovation, and the bishop's up-to-the
minute Arminianism resting ultimately on a medieval worldview. To
do justice to this epistemic clash, however, we once again need a
method of analyzing the debate without resolving its conflicts prema
turely.
At this point, the historian needs seriously to consider whether the
disagreement between these two men over the very terms of their
debate, like the repeated deadlocks by centuries of paid experts over the
definitions of Calvinism and Arminianism, can be resolved without
doing historical violence to the specificity of their arguments; One
possible strategy to read this exchange, however, would be to rethink
the roles of contradiction and error in the process of interpretation, and
make the contested term itself the focus of historical investigation,
remaining committed not to the unity but the irreducible ambiguity of
such key words. The most important unit in such an historical
semantic analysis is not the argument, as in philosophy, nor the idea, as
in the history of ideas, but the concept, which in contrast with the first
two notions is inherently non-unitary and historical. The goal of such
a "conceptual history" (Reinhart Koselleck) is to investigate how a
word's history of divergent usages has become sedimented and
condensed over time into a now-permanent state of ambiguity and
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semiotic richness.^^ As Koselleck writes in "Begriffsgeschichte and
Social History":
[A] concept must remain ambiguous to be a concept. The
concept is bound to a word, but is at the same time more
than a word: a word becomes a concept when the plenitude
of a politicosocial context of meaning and experience in and
for which a word is used can be condensed into one word.^^
Instead of denouncing or omitting previous interpretations as mere
error, conceptual history preserves at least some portion of the earlier
responses as valuable in themselves, because they allow the scholar to
conduct a meta-discussion about which parts of a text have been
considered difficult at various times, and to outline the competing
interpretations of a particular text or event that were offered at a
particular historical moment.
Without deciding who "won" the various stages of the debate, we
might still note certain problems faced by each man in presenting his
argument. For all the force of Bramhall's contempt and all the vigor of
his prose, Hobbes's ad hominem attacks demolish both the grounds to
Bramhall's commonsense and to his learning. The weakness of Bram-

" As Koselleckai^es, "The signification of a word can be thoiight separately from that which
is signified. S^nifier and signified coincide in the concept insofar as the diversity of historical
reality and historical experience enter a word snch that they <mionly receive their meaning in
this one word, or can only be grasped by this word. A word preserves potentialities for
meaning; a concept umtes within itself a plenitude of meaning. Hence, a concept can possess
clarity but must be ambiguous. 'All concepts escape definition thatsummarize semiotically an
entire process; only that which has no history is definable' (Nietzsche)," {futures Past: On the
Semantics of Historical Time, tr. Keith Tribe (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 84. Koselleck
himself has discussed Hobbes in his book Critique and Crisis, and owes considerable
methodological debts to the great, and notorious, Hobbes commentator Carl Schmitt.
"BegriffsgeschichteandSocialHistoiy,"inAw£Kreji'«sr, 84; but see also his statement in "The
Historical-Political Semantics of Asymmetric Counterconcepts": "History can only be written
if thecorrespondence between material that was oncecomprehended conceptually and theactual
material (methodologically derived from the first) is made the subject of investigation. This
correspondence is infinitely variable and must not be mistaken as anidentity; otherwise, every
source that was conceptually unambiguouswould already bethehistory that was sought within
it. In general, language and politico-social content coincide in a manner different from that
available or comprehensiUe to the speakingagentsthemsdvesf {my emp\i3sH\,Futures Past,161-62.
Mutually distorting polemics along the lines of the Hobbes-Bramhall debate provide the best
example of the epistemological problem of using oijy the participants' own langu^e to
understand historical events.
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hall's arguments become apparent when he (like every other advocate
for free will) appeals finally to nothing more than his own subjeaive
experience of freedom in the act of writing an attack upon Hobbes.
This is one of Bramhall's most embarrassing errors: in demanding that
his opponent describe the constraints upon his freedom, he has laid
himself open to a full diagnosis of his blindness, bias, prejudice, and
self-deception by his antagonist. Hobbes therefore obliges the bishop's
request for more information, and shows how Bramhall is nothing
more than a toy whipped about by forces he barely recognizes:
A wooden top that is lashed by the boys, and runs about
sometimes to one wall, sometimes to another, sometimes
spinning, sometimes hitting men on the shins, if it were
sensible of its own motions, would think it proceeded from
its own will, unless it felt what lashed it. And is a man any
the wiser, when he runs to one place for a benefice, to
another for a bargain, and troubles the world with writing
errors and requiring answer, because he thinks he doth it
without other cause than his own will, and seeth not what
are the lashings that cause his will? (LNC 55)
Bramhall does not understand the depth of Hobbes's critique of
free will, nor how completely Hobbes is willing to forego the commonsensical, intuitive understanding of individuals that they are free and
unconstrained, or how far outside Hobbes operates from what
Bramhall conceives of as the only possible "frame of learning."
Moreover, it does not occur to Bramhall how far his own actions and
motivations can be reduced to simple self-interest by a clever and
observant antagonist. In ways that Bramhall never acknowledges, the
speaacular political defeat of the Church of England has made possible
a demystifying, purely political public critique of the church that in
Hobbes's hands has a powerfully secularizing effect: Hobbes can
redescribe the church, the clergy, and their training-ground the
universities—all the sources of Bramhall's considerable institutional
authority—as merely human entities whose power derives from
temporal sources, not divine.
Throughout the entire debate, Bramhall seems either unable or
unwilling to understand Hobbes's distinaion between being free to do
what he will, and being free to will. As Hobbes complains, "If he has
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not been able to distinguish between these two questions, he has not
done well to meddle with either: if he has understood them, to bring
at^ments to prove that a man is free to do if he will, is to deal
uningenuously and fraudulently with his readers.* (LNC 5). And yet
this very deadlock in the discussion has the paradoxical result of
encouraging them to pursue their argument at the level of implications,
another sign that neither is willing to concede enough of his fundamen
tal stance even to entertain the other's position.
Bernard Williams's most recent discussion of the free will
problem, however, illuminates the mutual incomprehension of Hobbes
and Bramhall in an intriguing way, by reframing some of the character
istic confusions found in the philosophical debates on this question.
Williams makes two observations. His first observation is that free will
in the philosophical sense does not come in degrees, while freedom in
its more ordinary sense does. The concept of freedom, unlike that of
free will, is not inconsistent with the notion of various causes or
constraints impinging upon it. Freedom remains free even when it Is
not absolute, and in fact can only emerge in the context of a panicular
set of circumstances; I am free to choose to brush my teeth, though I
need a considerable number of things, including teeth, to be in place
before I can act on this plan." In contrast, any compromise or
conditioning of the freedom of the will entirely destroys its free nature;
I cannot claim 1 had free will in making this or that decision, with the
minor exception of that gun to my head or those bribes I collected
beforehand. Hence, free will and freedom cannot be treated as the same
thing, though its long history as a philosophical problem proceeds from
a longstanding need for just this kind of confusion. If Williams is
correct, the deadlock between Hobbes and Bramhall could be described
simply as a false debate between two men who did not realire they
w-ere arguing over two different things; Hobbes's primary stress b upon
the potentially limitless number of aases that might help determine
the will, while Bramhall insbts just as fiercely that the freedom of the
agent, as well as his free will, admits of no degrees. Thb kind of
solution by redescription, howes-er, still does not touch the hbtorkal
problem of why Hobbes and Bramhall apparently thotrght they were
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arguing about the same thing. Yet Williams's other observation
suggests a possible answer to this question.
Williams's second point is that free will, though it seems to
promote the autonomy and integrity of individuals in their ethical
conduct, has often been useful for its normative, policing function: the
existence of free will permits those who sin or otherwise deviate from
social norms to be blamed by others. In effect, the indeterminacy of
free will helps people to erect and maintain an entire social structure of
blame. As Williams puts it,
[moral responsibility explained in terms of blame] is con
ceived as the rough analogy in the moral realm to legal
penalties and denunciations. It is supposed to demand, more
stringently than in the legal case, that the agent could have
acted otherwise. (This is an application of the Plurality
Principle [Williams's term for free willj^^
What Williams terms the "morality-system," a normative system of
social blame and sanaion, depends upon a firm analogy between
morality and the law. The freedom of the agent to do otherwise makes
the actions of those who maintain the morality-system both necessary
and blameless in themselves. According to Williams, any separation of
morality from law, a differentiation which would allow those who
blame to be blamed themselves for the consequences of their blaming,
threatens this morality-system.
Now we may return to that commonsensical question of the
bishop, "Why do we blame them, if their will come not upon them
according to their will?" Although the bishop's thoughts about free
will and moral responsibility seem adequately described by Williams's
sketchy outline (blame = a legalistic investigation into whether the
agent could have aaed otherwise, with punishment following from the
degree of choice the agent possessed when sinning), Hobbes's notions
of blame are far more counter-intuitive and unfamiliar than his
opponent's.

Williams, "How free," 14.
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Hobbes admits that Bramhall's questions on blame are "difficult."
Yet he does not shrink from answering Bramhall's questions
line-for-line, point-by-point:
"Why do we blame them?" [asks the bishop] I answer,
because they please us not. I might ask him [in turn],
whether blaming be any thing else but saying the thing
blamed is ill or imperfect? May we not say a horse is lame,
though his lameness came from necessity? or that a man is a
fool or a knave, if he be so, though he could not help it?
(LNC 52)
If sin be a form of imperfection, asks Hobbes, why worry over the
precise cause? What is the purpose of the forensic investigation into the
sinful object's motive, if the blame (and the punishment) is God's to
administer, not the investigator's? Hobbes continues to quote, and
respond, to Bramhall, line-for-line:
How easily [continues the bishop] might [the sinners of
Matth. xxiii. 37] answer [Jesus], according to T.H.'s doctrine,
Alas! blame not us, our wills are not in our power?" I
answer, they are to be blamed though their wills be not in
their own power. Is not good good, evil evil, though they be
not in our power? and shall not I call them so? and is not
that praise and blame? But it seems the Bishop takes blame,
not for the dispraise of a thing, but for a pretext and colour
of malice and revenge against him he blameth (LNC 52-3).
Hobbes has found a worldly motive for blame, which pinpoints its
attractiveness to a clerical elite: the power it gives over other parts of
society. Blame is not a straightforwardly evaluative term ("dispraise of
a thing"), but "a pretext and colour of malice and revenge." According
to Hobbes's secularizing view, the clergy, by appropriating to itself the
right to investigate the precise degree of others' blame, has discovered
a perfect, because hidden, method for exercising its considerable moral
and political powers. In a curious way, Hobbes's determinism obviates
the need for the clergy to distribute blame at all, since blame and hope
are equally banished from his version of eternal punishment and
reward. As a result, Hobbes's notions of punishment are oddly lacking
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in one of the most traditional qualities of moralistic blame, its retribu
tive aspect, and Hobbes evinced a genuinely ethical disgust at the
Bishop's primitive notions of a God who could stoop to such human
passions as blame in His relentless course of operations.
Hobbes charges the bishop with what Nietzsche would later term
ressentiment, morality merely as "pretext and colour of malice and
revenge." In short, the bishop offers a morality as imagined by the
priest perennially jealous of others' power.^' In accordance with
Williams's description of the moralist, Bramhall, however, remains
unaffected by Hohbes's meta-ethical point, and continually searches for
evidence "that the agent could have acted otherwise," and consequently
asserts that
No man sins in doing those things which he could not shun,
or forbearing those things which never were in his power.
T.H. may say, that besides the power, men have also ^n
appetite to evil objeas, which renders them culpable. It is
true; but if this appetite be determined by another, not by
themselves, or if they have not the use of reason to curb or
restrain their appetites, they sin no more than a stone
descending downward, according to its natural appetite, or
the brute beasts who commit voluntary errors in following
their sensitive appetites, yet sin not. (LNC 45)
Hohbes's reply is devastating, insisting more strongly upon the reality
and objectivity of sin than the Bishop does: "He may as well say, no
man halts which cannot choose but halt; or stumbles, that cannot
choose but stumble. For what is sin, but halting or stumbling in the
way of God's commandments?" (LNG 54). Hobbes charges that
Bramhall, by championing the power of reason in this context, has
" See also Hobbes's treatment in Behemoth of tbe priestly ascetic attitude towards sexuality,
wbich is oriented purely towards gaining power over the king and the conunon people:"And,
whereas they did, bothin their sermons and writings, maintain and inculcate,that the very first
motions of the mind, that is to say, the delight men and women took in the sight of one
another's form, though they checked the proceedii^ thereof so that it never grew up to be a
design, was nevertheless a sin, they broughtyoung meninto desperation andto think themselves
danined, because they could not (which no man can, and is contrary to the constitution of
nature) behold a delightful object without delight. And by this means they became confessors
to such as were troubledin conscience, and were obeyed by them astheir spiritual doctors in ah
cases of consaence," 26.
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inadvertently erased sin from this picture of human ethical life. And
yet Bramhall, when he wishes to defend his own power and position,
is nonetheless able to denigrate the reason of laymen like Hobbes as
"poisoned intelleauals." Hobbes's necessitarian position, as unpalat
able and as counter-intuitive as it might seem, nonetheless has the
advantage of consistency over Bramhall, who must sometimes argue for
human depravity, sometimes for the resemblance between human
reason and divine, sometimes depicting God as forgiving, sometimes as
angry and vengeful, all to justify consistently his ascendancy over a lay
opponent.
As the exchange over free will and blame suggests, however, the
ethical problems created by the doctrine of free will for the human
agent, however, slide from vexing questions of human culpability to the
still less intelligible problem of divine justice. In other words, how just
are God's punishments, if He can be shown to have caused any action
that merited such punishments? Ironically for two royalists equally
interested in shoring up the sovereign's powers, the implicit resem
blances of divine and temporal judgment and power unexpectedly
complicated their debate, since it is surprisingly difficult to celebrate
both temporal and divine authorities at the same time. Bramhall's
"moderate royalism" rested upon conventional sources of legitimation
and authority such as the church and the patriarchal identification of
the king as the head of the family-nation, and to some extent Bramhall's
picture of their relations, though modified by the interregnum
experience, was essentially unchanged by its dislocations. Not so with
Hobbes, whose reading of the civil war's causes demanded a
reconceptualization of the social and political funaion of the clergy.
Hobbes opened up the distressing possibility that there could be no
analogy drawn between the operations of divine and temporal justice,
and none therefore between divine and temporal authority; the
conflicting claims of divine and temporal justice, though both in their
way absolute, would have to be pursued separately.
The consequences each man was able to draw from his own and
his opponents' position reveal their similarities as well as differences.^'
Bramhall, for example, when citing the "inconveniences" of Hobbes's
notion of necessity, shrewdly focused upon its destructiveness to both

» See Mintz, Hunting, 111.
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civil order and religious faith: "Either allow liberty, or destroy Church
as well as commonwealth, religion as well as policy," he declared (LNC
198). Bramhall resembles Hobbes in his concern for the political
stability of "commonwealths in this world."
But they must diverge when discussing the religious implications
of Hobbes's version of necessity. The question of the justice and mercy
of God hangs upon this question.
But [as Hobbes summarizes] the greatest inconvenience of all
that the Bishop pretends may be drawn from this opinion, is,
"that God in justice cannot punish a man with eternal
torments for doing that which it was never in his power to
leave undone." (LNC 16)
If Hobbes's determinism is correct, then Bramhall believed that God's
punishments are utterly arbitrary, and delivered without reference to
human distinaions of good and evil:
Hobbes, however, shifts the ground of discussion from human
conceptions of justice to the divine. Because of His unique power, not
just of life and death but even of creation over all living things, God's
attitude to humanity cannot resemble that of the angry parent
chastising a child with a rod, but the potter who tests his wares by
tapping them with a stick'®:
It is true, that seeing the name of punishment hath relation
to the name of crime, there can be no punishment but for
crimes that might have been left undone; but instead of
punishment if he had said affliction, may not I say that God
may afflict, and not for sin? Doth he not afflict those
creatures that cannot sin? And sometimes those that can sin,
and yet not for sin, as Job, and the man in the gospel that was
born blind, for the manifestation of his power which he hath
over his creature, no less but more than hath the potter over
his clay to make of it what he please. But though God have
power to afflict a man and not for sin without injustice, shall
we think God so cruel as to afflia a man, and not for sin,
This image follows the language of Romans 9. The potter in the marketplace taps only the
strongest pots.
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with extreme and endless torment? Is it not cruelty? No
more than to do the same for sin, when he that hath so
afflicteth might without trouble have kept him from sinning.
(LNC 16-7)
In an astonishing act of redescription, Hobbes demolishes the distinc
tion between God's punishments and his afflictions, and directs the
question of cruelty back to the bishop: who is crueler, one who denies
free will while allowing a limited torment in the afterlife, or one who
supports free will yet maintains the existence of eternal torment in a
literal hell?
Opposed here are fundamental images of divine punishment and
its purposes, derived from their respective images of the deity who
punishes.
But what infallible evidence hath the Bishop, that a man shall
be after this life eternally in torments and never die? Or how
is it certain there is no second death, when the Scriptures
saith there is? Or where doth the Scriptures say that a second
death is an endless life?...There is no injustice nor cruelty in
him that giveth life, to give with it sickness, pain, torments
and death; nor in him that giveth life, twice, to give the same
miseries twice also. (LNC 17)
Hobbes offers his own highly unorthodox theory of divine punish
ment: the annihilation of souls. He believes that the torments of hell
are for a limited span of time ("the second life"), followed by the
ultimate extinction of sinners' souls ("the second death").Hobbes
discovers in this arrangement, and not Bramhall's orthodox hell, a form
of justice worthy of an omnipotent, foreseeing deity.

" For an mteresting comparison of Hobbes's mortalism to tbose of tbe Leveller Overton, see
B. J. Gibbons, "Ricbard Overton and tbe Secularism of tbe Interregnum Radicals." The
Seventeenth Century 10, no.1 (1995): 63-75. For an example of tbe survival of tbis beresy well
into tbe eigbteentb c«ntuiy, see B.W.Young, "'Tbe Soul-Sleeping System*:Politics and Heresy
mEigbteentb-CenturyEngland."/o«nM/o/£cc/«Mit/Vtf/f/wto»y 45, no.1 (1994): 64-81. See also
D. P. Walker, The Declineof Hell: Seventeenth-Century Discussions ofEtemtd Torment (Cbicago:
University of Cbicago Press, 1964).
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Bramhall, however, believes that Hobbes's necessity, because it
bypasses the questions of choice that ground his own notions of moral
responsibility, will destroy all piety, obedience and prayer:
Who will bewail his sins with tears?...A man may grieve for
that which he could not help; but he will never be brought
to bewail that as his own fault, which flowed not from his
own error, but from antecedent necessity...To what end shall
he pray God to avert those evils which are inevitable, or to
confer those favours which are impossible? (LNC 198)
The bishop cannot conceive of an active, genuine worship that did
not include activities like bewailing with tears, grieving, or offering
passionate prayers to a forgiving God. Hobbes, however, is particularly
careful in his response to this question. He acknowledges that his
answer might injure the piety of most men, but proceeds on condition
that the bishop keep these dangerous truths private.
Hobbes's response is that all the emotional, subjective aspects of
worship celebrated by Bramhall, no matter how necessary they are to
human beings in their fallen state, are unnecessary, perhaps even
distracting, to those who would maintain a properly abstract concep
tion of the deity. Here we find in Hobbes a gesture consonant with
both ultra-Protestantism and secularism. Hobbes discovers no impiety
in the idea that God is unaffected by prayer, because
piety consisteth only in two things; one, that we honour God
in our hearts, which is, that we think of his power as highly
as we can: for to honour any thing, is nothing else but to
think it to be of great power. The other, that we signify that
honour and esteem by our words and actions, which is called
cultus or worship of God. (LNC 199)
In Hobbes's religion, like his politics, the possibility of justice rests
ultimately on overwhelming—that is to say, undivided—power, not
any mere subjective experience of mercy, belief, or the tightness or
wrongness of things. Human beings are simply too far removed from
the objects of such knowledge, too misguided and hapless in their
pursuits to determine such things for themselves. The only appropriate
human response is an obedience that demonstrates our submission to
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God. Any desire to anticipate His judgments is a concealed attempt to
influence Him emotionally, an absurd notion for an all-knowing deity:
The end of prayer, as of thanksgiving, is not to move, but to honor
God Almighty, in acknowledging that what we ask can be effected by
Him only (LNC 201).
Bramhall, stung by Hobbes's assertion that religion is simply the
worship of the powerful by the powerless, revisits Hobbes's image of
the deity, pointing out the ugliness and cruelty of His unrestrained
power and bloodlust:
[Absolute necessity] destroys the goodness of God, making
him to be a hater of mankind, and to delight in the torments
of his creatures; whereas the very dogs licked the sores of
Lazarus, in pity and commiseration of him. (LNC 202)'^
Characteristically, Bramhall's anthropomorphization of God leads
him to attributing specific emotions to Him such as "hate" or "delight,"
and making humanity the focal point of His attentions, positive or
negative: if Hobbes is right, God must be a "hater of mankind."
Bramhall's attribution of emotions to the deity naturally leads him to
assume that God experiences tender feelings for the sufferings of his
creations, feelings nonetheless available even to the lower parts of His
creation. In absolute contrast, Hobbes surveys the oceanic suffering of
all living things, and finds that such a spectacle simply blots out the
anthropomorphic notion of a sympathetic deity. No human conception
of mercy could satisfactorily describe the response of a divine creator
to all the world's scenes of living and dying:
I cannot imagine, when living creatures of all sorts are often
in torments as well as men, that God can be displeased with
it: without his will, they neither are nor could be at all
tormented. Nor yet is he delighted with it; but health.
This is not the Lazarus brought back from
dead, but the beggar in the parable of thelidli
man and Lazarus: *'Anddiere was a certain beggarnamed Lazarus, which was laid at [the lich
man's] gate fullof sores, And desiiing to be fed with the crumbs which fell from the rich man's
table; moreoverthe dogs came andlickedhis sores'* (Luke 16.20-21). Bramhall's allusionto this
parable is doubly appropriate, because it upholds the absolute gap between divine reward and
punishment: though they can see each across the divide, Lazarus remains in the bosom of
Abraham, the rich man in hell.
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sickness, ease, torments, life and death, are without all passion
in him dispensed by him; and he putteth an end to them then
when they end, and a beginning when they begin, according
to his eternal purpose, which cannot be resisted. That the
necessity argueth a delight of God in the torments of his
creatures, is even as true, as that it was pity and commisera
tion in the dogs that made them lick the sores of Lazarus.
(LNC 213; [my emphasis])

Hobbes would rather preserve the omnipotence and foreknow
ledge of God than attribute human conceptions of mercy or Justice to
him. Hobbes's God, like the God that tested Job, cannot be moved,
cannot be bribed, and lacks the passions that would only constrain his
unlimited power." Pity is therefore a profoundly human attribute, and
a quality as unsuited for God as it is for the dogs in the parable.
Ultimately, Hobbes cannot see any moral distinction between his
image of the deity and Bramhall's, except that his is more merciful in
the long term:
And if a man cannot praise God for his goodness, who creates
millions to burn eternally without their fault; how can the
Bishop praise God for his goodness, who thinks he hath
created millions of millions to burn eternally, when he could
have kept them so easily from committing any fault? (LNG
216)
Hence, Hobbes's treatment of Hell echoes his endorsement of simple
punishment, not blame, for human errors in condua: since God cannot
experience malice or revenge by afflicting His creations, neither should
human authorities when they punish their own reprobates. Hobbes
undoes Bramhall's simple equations of divine and human justice by
questioning the attributes that Bramhall unreflectively transfers from
one sphere to the other.
For Hobbes, the emotional responses of pity, compassion, and
sympathy are signs of our nature as beings "human, all-too-human,"
symptoms of weakness, partiality, and blindness rather than some spark

"Job, of course, renuined one of Hobbes's favorite scriptural texts tbrougbout bis life.
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of the divine, and therefore unsuited to the all-seeing eye or the mighty
arm of Hobbes's God. Though Hobbes is often taken as a champion
of egoism, he seems in works like the Questions and the Behemoth to be
instead a philosopher of human weakness, particularly the least
attractive form of human weakness, the will to violence and revenge.^'*
By discovering such weakness at the heart of the human attraction to
divine power, Hobbes annoyed the clerical guardians of religious
experience, but did honor to his own conceptions of God.
Hobbes's separation of religious conduct from the vagaries of
individual faith and emotion is consistent with his earlier desire to seal
off internal, theological disputes from the wider arena of state politics.
He has the painful experience of the civil war to show how clerical
emotions like pride or resentment once divided the authority and
normative force of the sovereign. Hence, Hobbes's goal in this debate
with Bramhall is effectively to partition religious questions from
political ones. As Bramhall recognized, such a redefinition of the
boundaries between the religious and the political entailed a thorough
subordination of the priestly class to the prerogatives of the sovereign,
and a "de-sacralization" of clerical institutions into instruments of
human, not divine, power.
Hobbes and Bramhall can both be seen as participating in the large
historical process of secularization, since they must both contend with
the state of English politics extant after the failure of the king and
bishops in the civil war. The secularization-narrative offered in this
essay, however, following Hobbes's own practice, focuses on the
process of institutional division and fragmentation, not the psychologistic process of disenchantment, anomie, or ennui as described by Max
Weber or other critics of modernity. Hobbes, unlike Weber, under-

"Such a contradiction may have been at the heart of T.S. Eliot's weirdly obtuse comments on
the Hobbes-Bramhall debate: "Thomas Hobbes was one of those extraordinary little upstarts
whom the chaotic motions of the Renaissance tossed into an eminence which they hardly
deserved and havenever lost...Hobbes wasa revolutionary in thought and a timid conservative
in action; and histheory of government is congenial to that type of person who is conservative
from prudence but revolutionary in his dreams. This type of person is not altogether
uncommon. In Hobbes there are symptoms of the same mentality as Nietzsche: his belief in
violence is a confession of weakness. Hobbes's violence is of a type that often appeals to gentle
people. His specious effect of tmity between a very simple theory of sense perception and an
equally simple theory of governmentis of akind thatwill always be popular because it appears
to be intellectual but is really emotional, and therefore very soothing to lazy minds;" ("John
'm
Essays Ancient and Modem, (London: Faber & Faber, 1936), 33; 41-2).
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stands modernity not as a loss of norms or a fading of normativity, but
instead as a continual renewal or reconstrurtion of norms in reponse to
historical change. The very difficulties we have in understanding the
high stakes of Hobbes and Bramhall's debate testify to the historical
success of this double-process of secularization and normative recon
struction.

